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Outline of Presentation
• Investigative Approach
• An Optocoupler’s Tale
• On the Matter of Small Probabilities
• What’s with the Noise Spikes?
• The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link
• Considerations
Latent damage sites: device did not fail during ground irradiation,
but at some time afterward during operation.
Could this have been observed in-flight?
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Anomaly Resolution – 
Root Cause Investigation for Radiation Engineers
• Determine orbital location and time of event
– Look for the obvious such as solar events or South Atlantic 
Anomaly (SAA)
• Review electronic parts list for potential sensitive devices
• Review identified device in specific circuit application
– Factors such as duty cycle, operating speed, voltage levels, 
and so forth
• Obtain existing SEE, dose, and damage data or gather new 
data
– Compare applications between in-circuit and ground data
– Perform ground testing if needed
• Determine risk probabilities
– SEE rates, etc
– Failure potential
• Recommend mitigative action(s) if possible
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An Optocoupler’s Tale - Background
• Optocouplers
– Used extensively for the isolation of signals between 
systems or boxes
– Translate electrical signals to optical, then back to 
electrical
• What radiation-induced failure modes may exist?
– Long-term degradation such as current transfer ratio 
(CTR) – output/input
– Single particle events
• Photodiodes, for example, have a history of being used as 
energetic particle detectors!
Typical Block Diagram of an Optocoupler
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An Optocoupler’s Tale – 
NASA’s Most Famous Science Spacecraft
• Hubble Space Telescope (HST)
– Flying for over 18 years
– Tremendous scientific discoveries (as well as gorgeous images!)
• HST has had several servicing missions (SM) 
– New instruments
– System upgrades and maintenance
• On the SM2, launched Feb 14th, 1997, two new instruments were 
installed
– Multiple anomalies were observed during the on-orbit engineering 
calibration for these instruments
– HST’s main radiation concern is SAA
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An Optocoupler’s Tale – 
Resolving the Anomaly
• What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and action?
– Review of environment during anomalies
• All events occurred in the SAA
– Review of parts list
• Optocoupler highlighted as most likely candidate
– Review of circuit application
• SETs simulated showing possible cause
– SET could trigger a high-voltage portion of the instrument and cause failure
– Review or gather radiation test data
• No data existed; accelerator test performed
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The Optocoupler – Final Analysis
• What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and action? - 
continued
– Determine risk probability (i.e., upset rates)
• Optocouplers are not just electrical
• Considerations for tools beyond CREME96 began with this and 
related work
– Determine actions to mitigate or reduce risk
• In-flight hardware is not easily modified ;o(
– FPGAs improve this ability (but not here)
• Operational change installed via software update
– No instrument operation during SAA
– Critical science was NOT impacted, but some science data loss 
incurred
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On the Matter of Small Probabilities - 
Background
• Solid State Recorders (SSRs)
– A means for storing science data on-board a spacecraft
– Use high-density memory ICs for density/power advantages
• SRAM (early 1990’s) 
• DRAM (mid-1990’s and later) 
• Flash (being considered)
• DRAMs: What radiation-induced failure modes may exist?
– TID
• Traditional leakage increases, cell failures, etc…
– SEE
• Destructive: SEL, stuck bits
• Upset: bit/multiple bits, block errors, mode errors, SEFI
1 Gb SDRAM circa 2006
Feature size is 90nm
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On the Matter of Small Probabilities – 
NASA’s Most Famous Science Spacecraft (yet again!)
• On the SM2, Feb 14th, 1997, a new SSR was 
installed to increase data storage capacity
– HST passes through the SAA several times daily
• Bit upsets tracked fairly well with predicted rate based on 
ground data (3 samples, one proton energy)
• HOWEVER, two more complex anomalies were observed
– Each had ~ 100 bits in error (block)
– Block was not corrected by a re-write
– Project in panic!
HST SSR utilizes
Irvine Sensors DRAM Modules
Comprised of 16 Mb IBM Luna DRAMs
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On the Matter of Small Probabilities– 
Resolving the Anomaly
• What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and 
action?
– Review of environment during anomaly
• SAA
– Review of parts list
• Memory controller was rad-hard
• DRAM was not
– Review of circuit application
• Circuit application was the same as in ground testing (refresh rate, 
etc)
– Review or gather radiation test data
• Proton data: no observed block errors (sample size = 3 w/ 1x 
environment fluences)
• HOWEVER, heavy ion data exhibited these type of events at low LETs
– Proton events would be expected
– New test data required for statistics on 1440 device usage
• With 1440 devices being used for this SSR application
– Expected event cross-section of ~a few E-13 cm2 based on 2 events in 9 
months versus (predicted) in-flight proton fluence
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On the Matter of Small Probabilities– 
Final Analysis
• Review or gather radiation test data (cont’d)
– New test undertaken with protons with 100 die and to higher 
proton fluence levels
• 9 events observed with proton fluences ~100x over expected HST 
expected levels
– 2 different event signatures noted
» block (column/row) errors
» weak columns (suspect data – sometimes good, sometimes bad)
• Determine risk probability (i.e., upset rates)
– Predicted error rate of 2.2/yr is the same order of magnitude as 
observed
• Determine actions to mitigate or reduce risk
– Reset of mode register or power cycle clear the anomaly
• Circuitry not included to provide reset
• Power cycle determined to be feasible when needed
– Data is Reed-Solomon (RS) Encoded
» Probability of RS failure is low
– No action taken at that time
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What’s With the Noise Spike? - Background
• Linear devices such as analog comparators are
– Used extensively in instruments, power, data collection, and 
more
– Compares the voltage levels between two analog signals
• What radiation-induced failure modes may exist?
– Long-term degradation is focused on 
• Enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS) and displacement 
damage (in bipolars)
– Single events
• Single event transients (SETs) are the prime concern.
-4
-2
0
2
4
1.2 10-5 1.4 10-5 1.6 10-5 1.8 10-5 2 10-5 2.2 10-5 2.4 10-5 2.6 10-5 2.8 10-5
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
V
o
l
t
a
g
e
 
(
V
)
Time (s)
LM139, V
cc
=+/-5, δV
i
=800mV, LET=18.7 MeV-cm2/mg
Sample SETs induced by heavy ions
in a PM/LM139 comparator
13In-Flight Electronics and Radiation – Presented by Kenneth A. LaBel, SERESSA, West Palm Beach, Fl 12/2/2008
What’s With the Noise Spike? – 
Microwave Anisotropy Probe (MAP)
• Launched June 30, 2001.
– Had phasing orbits prior 
to insertion in final orbit.
• Reached its final orbital 
position on L2 end of 
September, 2001.
• An anomaly occurred 
causing a reset of the 
spacecraft processor on 
November 5, 2001.
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What’s With the Noise Spike? – 
Resolving the Anomaly
• What steps were 
needed to 
determine ROOT 
CAUSE and action?
– Review of 
environment during 
anomaly
• Solar event
– Significant heavy 
ion component
– Review of parts list
• Analog comparator 
(PM/LM139) identified 
as likely problem 10-5
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What’s With the Noise Spike? – 
Resolving the Anomaly (2)
– Review of circuit application
• Confirmed that LM/PM139 could be the cause
• Application had changed since initial parts review pre-launch
– Review or gather radiation test data
• No documented proton sensitivity
• Heavy ion sensitivity documented as a function of the 
application using existing data plus new data gathered
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What’s With the Noise Spike? – 
Final Analysis
• What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and action? 
- continued
– Determine risk probability (i.e., upset rates with heavy ions)
• Additional shielding analysis performed for particle transport
• Assumption of sensitive volume thicknesses
– Determine actions to mitigate or reduce risk
• Event rates deemed acceptable by project
• No action taken
Sensitive volume
thickness
(μm)
GCR SET rate
CREME96, solar maximum
(event/ comparator-day)
Solar Event
CREME96, worst day
(event/ comparator-day)
10 1.8E-3 5.1E-1
15 1.7E-3 3.0E-1
20 1.6E-3 1.8E-1
30 1.5E-3 6.5E-2
40 1.3E-3 4.4E-2
60 9.9E-4 3.4E-2
17In-Flight Electronics and Radiation – Presented by Kenneth A. LaBel, SERESSA, West Palm Beach, Fl 12/2/2008
The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic 
Link (FOL) - Background
• FOLs
– MIL-STD-1773 implementation (1 MHz) 
used since the early 1990’s in many 
NASA systems
– Transmits electrical data and 
command signals to/from optical
• What radiation-induced failure modes 
may exist?
– Similar to optocouplers
– SEUs imply single or multi-bit errors
• Photodiodes, have a history of being 
used as energetic particle detectors.
• Errors are temporal via photodiode
– Transients may affect more than one 
clock cycle
• High-speed electrical circuits also 
sensitive
• Major impact is on data bit error rate 
(BER)
Representative FOL architecture
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The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic 
Link (FOL)- Background (cont’d)
• Original MIL-STD-1773 transceivers used Si photodiodes
– Sensitive to direct ionization from protons
• Implies high bit error rate (BER) for space applications.
– Angle of incidence, optical power budget, and proton energy effects 
noted
• This forced the usage of protocol fault-tolerant features to be 
implemented (message retries).
– Used successfully in NASA misions
• BUT reduced effective bus bandwidth by ~50%.
• For higher data rate systems, this hardening solution may not be applicable.
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The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic 
Link (FOL)- Making a Better Mousetrap
• Hardening methodologies explored
– Change of optical wavelength from 850 nm to 1300 nm light showed 
improved SEU tolerance 
• Reduced volume of photodiode
– Receiver noise filtering techniques and optical power budgets also 
help
– Higher data rate development (20 MHz) – AS1773
• Flown as an experiment on Microelectronics and Photonics Testbed (MPTB)
– Boeing DR1773 Transceivers
FPGA
ELECTRICAL8051-BASED
DATA
COLLECTIONS
POWER
SUPPLIES
IN-LINE
ATTENUATORS
OPTICAL
OUT 2OUT 1
MPTB DR1773 Test Board
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The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL) 
– MPTB Performance
• MPTB launched in 1997
– 6 years of in-flight 
performance in a highly 
elliptical orbit (HEO)
• Transceivers were 
operated in two modes
– ED mode used a 
physical contact (PC) 
polished fiber optic 
terminal
– DE mode used a flat 
polished connector (air 
gap)
• Which do you think 
would work better?
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The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic 
Link (FOL) – In-Flight
• Did the hardening effort pay off?
ED and DE bit error rates by Year
Year
ED BER DE BER
1997 1.738E-12 N/A
1998 4.224E-14 3.787E-11
1999 3.855E-14 5.303E-11
2000 0 8.501E-11
2001 8.168E-15 N/A
2002 0 N/A
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Considerations
• Methodical process for anomaly review takes into account
– Environment
– Selected parts
– Design
– Existing radiation test data and/or new data
– Impact (i.e., risk probability)
– Actions (mitigative or otherwise)
• Notes:
– Design and parts list reviews are good for flight programs
• BUT, any changes later in design process need to be reviewed as 
well
– Protons aren’t always the cause of anomalies during solar 
events
• Solar heavy ions must be taken into account
– System design and not just device radiation tolerance needs 
to be taken into account
• Mechanical issues, for example, can be related (as in the FOL 
example)
– Spacecraft charging effects not discussed, but should be 
considered as well
• Can charging in plastic packages be the next SEU?
